ABSTRACT
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the basic theory of voluntary contributions to the open-source development process is outlined.
In Section III, the drawbacks of existing large-scale surveys are highlighted, previous econometric findings from studies that collect their own unique data sets are discussed.
In section IV, the forward-looking model of software-developer employment and opensource contribution decisions, incorporating all three supply factors in a single model, is specified. The final section summarizes and concludes. 3 
The Basic Theory of Voluntary Software Contributions
Consider the case of a software developer that has written a fix for a bug in an existing software program. 2 Assume that the developer was originally motivated to write the patch for his own personal use of the program. In addition, assume that there is a very high degree of uncertainty regarding the value of the patch to other software developers/consumers so that there is no non-zero price at which others are willing to buy it. Under these conditions, the developer of the patch will be indifferent between keeping the patch for himself, which yields zero profits, and distributing the patch to the public for free, which also yields zero profits (assuming zero costs of distribution).
The costs that the developer initially incurs to produce the patch are not relevant in the decision to release or not release because development costs are sunk.
In the above scenario, the software developer's indifference between keeping the patch private, and releasing the patch to the public for free, can be broken by assuming that there are differential expected future returns between the two options. Raymond (1999c) maintains that higher future returns are captured when the patch is released for free because it gives rise to reciprocal giving. That is, distributing the patch to the public for free will encourage other software developers to do the same with their own privately produced patches, and many of these patches will turn out to be useful to others in the community. Hence, releasing the patch for free is the optimal choice for each developer, and is the equilibrium outcome.
Although Raymond relies rather heavily on a social psychological notion of reciprocal giving, this assumption is not at all necessary for breaking the tie between releasing and not releasing. The same equilibrium outcome of voluntary contributions could arise if one's reputation as a skilled programmer is enhanced by distributing the patch for free. That is, by revealing one's programming code, the developer can 2 The following example is adapted from Raymond (1999c an accounting package for a commercial firm is generally considered to be less "challenging" than contributing to a mathematical program to be used by researchers.
Developers may also intensely fear that the firm will "hijack" the resulting software product and eventually close it off from further open source development.
It is for these latter reasons that the form of intellectual property protection, or the license under which a project is released, can be a critical factor in the developer's decision to supply labor to open source development. In some cases, it may be that the only way a firm (or other project initiator) can induce developers to participate in an open source project is to put the project under a restrictive license such as the GNU General Public License (GPL). GPL is a restrictive license because it requires that the initial code and all modifications remain freely available, that any derivative work is also licensed as GPL, and that the resulting code not be mixed with closed source software in any re-distributed works. GPL makes commercialization of the 5 Raymond is essentially applying ideas developed in Hayek (1945) Table 1 indicates that the respondents are generally young, male, single, and highly educated. The most common profession is software engineer, followed by programmer, consultant and university employee. A little more than 20% of the sample consists of university students. 8 Approximately 70% of the 7 Firms operating in low transactions costs environment may be able to mitigate free-rider costs of opening-up the code by forming a consortium (see, e.g., West and Gallagher (2004) Table 2 displays the percentage of respondents choosing a pre-selected set of reasons for becoming an OS/FS developer. Each respondent was allowed to choose more than one reason in the list so the percentages can add to more than
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100%.
The table shows that 79% of the respondents joined the OS/FS community because they were interested in learning and developing new skills. The next most frequent reason, accounting for 49% of respondents, was a desire to share already existing knowledge and skills. The desire to improve job opportunities, to get a reputation in the OS/FS community, and to make money are relatively less important, but are not negligible.
The bottom panel of Table 2 
Econometric Studies
One of the most notable econometric studies to date that is related to The objective of the software developer is to choose an employment and project participation state in each time t to maximize the expected present discounted value of remaining lifetime utility. Remaining lifetime utility at time t for developer i is
where V it is the value function, U it (·) is the utility flow, δ is the subjective discount factor and S it is the state space. S it consists of all the factors known to the individual at time t affecting current returns or the probability distribution of future returns.
The maximization problem in (1) can be recast in terms of alternative specific value functions, V kl it (S it ), each of which follow Bellman's equation, i.e.,
¤ where
In the terminal period T , there is no future component to the value function and the individual maximizes current utility flow U iT .
For simplicity, U it in (2) is assumed to be a linear function of consumption and open source participation status, i.e.,
where C it is current period consumption, γ 1 is the non-pecuniary return to par- Consumption in each period t is determined by a budget constraint that is assumed to be satisfied in each period and which takes the following form,
b 0 is the current period return to being in the unemployment state and is meant to capture unemployment insurance, welfare benefits, liquidation of previous assets, and the net consumption value of leisure. b 1 is the deterministic component of the current period return to being a post-secondary school student. b 1 reflects in-school labor market earnings and the net consumption value of schooling less tuition costs and other related expenses. ε i1t is the stochastic component of schooling's current period return which captures variability in in-school labor market earnings and other shocks to preferences for schooling. w it is the wage the individual receives as a full-time software developer and is also allowed to be stochastic. 12 The parameter c is the The wage w it in (4) is further specified to be a function of education, experience, age, and an unobserved individual effect. That is, w it = w it (x i1t , x i2t , os it , t, α i , ε i2t ) where x i1t is accumulated years of post-secondary education, x i2t is accumulated general experience as a software developer, and os it is accumulated specific experience as an open source software developer. The influence of age is captured by t, α i is an unobserved individual fixed effect, and ε i2t is a productivity shock assumed to be i.i.d.
and serially uncorrelated. The wage function can also be augmented with observed individual characteristics such as race and gender. However, it is generally difficult to estimate dynamic programming models of labor force dynamics with ε i2t allowed to be serially correlated.
The education and experience terms in w it evolve according to the laws of motion, In order to minimize the number of distributional assumptions in the model, the unobserved individual effect, α i is specified to be stochastic with a nonparametric mass point distribution. That is, α i is assumed to be a linear function of two unobserved "type" dummies,
where A 1i is a dummy variable for unobserved type 1 and A 2i is a dummy variable for unobserved type 2. A 0i is a dummy for unobserved "type" 0. As the base type, A 0i is excluded from (5). In this setup, three type probabilities, which define the discrete nonparametric distribution of α i , are estimated along with the two non-zero location points of α i , denoted by θ 1 and θ 2 .
Assuming a standard Mincerian wage function, w it can be written as,
An additional constraint imposed on the maximization problem is that a developer must receive a job offer prior to receiving a wage offer determined by (7) . That is, with probability λ e t the developer receives a wage offer of w it , and with probability 1 − λ 
